Transaction cost theory in family firms remains underresearched and studies have not yet linked elements of transaction cost theory with the governance decisions of family firms. In this paper, we compare the governance choices of family and nonfamily firms regarding their outsourcing tendencies. We argue that family firms and nonfamily firms differ in subcontracting decisions. We build on transaction cost theory to develop and test a model explaining how subcontractors with kinship ties, importance of business activities, and cost concern affect subcontracting in family firms. Our empirical results provide evidence about these determinants. We conclude by discussing further research implications.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper uses transaction cost theory as the theoretical basis to study governance decisions about subcontracting in family firms. Particularly, we focus our attention on (a) finding differences on the use of subcontractors between family and nonfamily firms and (b) determining the antecedents of family firms' subcontracting decisions. The main tenets of transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975a; 1981; 1985) explain the gain on efficiencies that firms obtain when analyzing make or buy decisions. In the context of family firms, the family involvement factor tends to play an important role on boundary decision making. Because of efficiencies, risk aversion, and opportunism, family firms will less likely to engage in subcontracting than nonfamily firms. In addition, we outline three antecedents to subcontracting decisions in family firms: (1) subcontractors with kinship ties, (2) cost concerns, and (3) importance of family business activities.
Using a sample of 2170 former SBDC clients (297 nonfamily and 1790 family firms), we tested our set of hypotheses via ANCOVA and OLS regression. Our results provide support about the differences in subcontracting decisions between family and non-family firms, and that importance of business activities and cost concerns are antecedents to the use of subcontracting.
We contribute to the literature by using the transaction cost framework to outline the subcontracting differences between family and nonfamily firms as well as identifying specific antecedents of subcontracting in family firms. Our primary implication for theory and practice is that the behaviors and complexities surrounding the family firm tend to influence how resources and activities are performed. Particularly, family firms benefit from the involvement of the family members to conduct activities that are cost reducing to improve their levels of competitiveness. Further avenues of research and practice are also discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975a; 1985) deals with the governance decisions of organizations (Poppo and Zenger, 1998) and the efficient boundaries of a firm (Williamson, 1981) . The extent to which a firm prefers making or buying a product or service and whether the contract would be arms length or relational can determine whether a firm chooses hierarchical governance, marketing contracting, or strategic alliances (Walker and Weber, 1984; Williamson, 1981) . Asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty regarding opportunism are argued to be the primary factors affecting governance decisions (Williamson, 1985) . In addition, recent studies have also discussed risk preferences as a third important factor (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Gulati, 1995; Williamson, 1991) .
Family firms form a major portion of national economies throughout the world (Dyer and Handler, 1994) . However, the focus of organizational research has been on nonfamily firms and many issues family firms face remain unclear theoretically and practically (Dyer, 2003; Hoy and Verser, 1994) . Governance decisions involving efficient boundaries are the key issue in understanding family firms since governance choices play a critical role in their performance and long-term survival and the involvement of the family in the firm is likely to influence those choices (cf., Carney, 2005) . However, we know little about the elements affecting these decisions. Hence, the theory of the family firm will be advanced by identifying the family firmspecific transaction cost factors affecting make-or-buy decisions of family firms. Accordingly, we specifically address two important research questions regarding the governance decisions pertaining to subcontracting decisions: (1) Are family firms more or less likely to use subcontractors than non-family firms, and (2) What are the antecedents of family firms' subcontracting decisions? Recently, there has been a call for studies within the framework of transaction cost theory to explain governance decisions of small firms (Dewald, Hall, Chrisman, and Kellermanns, 2007) . Accordingly, we apply transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975b; Williamson, 1985) to develop and test a model about the nature of family and nonfamily firms' subcontracting tendencies. Our model examines the direct effects that (1) kinship ties with subcontractors, (2) the importance of firm activities, and (3) cost concerns have on family firms' preferences for outsourcing rather than producing internally.
Our study contributes to the family firm literature in several ways. First, we use transaction cost theory as theoretical lens to show how the idiosyncratic propensities of family firms influence their governance decisions and to what extent these decisions are likely to differ from those made by nonfamily firms. This line of investigation enhances the development of the theory of the family firms and highlights the importance of incorporating transaction cost theory into family business studies (Chrisman, Chua, and Litz, 2004; Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma, 2005; Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma, 1999) . Second, we examine family firm specific factors that influence the propensity of family firms to use subcontractors. By doing so, we contribute to a better understanding of the differences among family firms that are likely to have an impact on their decision-making and performance. Indeed, our results provide further insights about the factors influencing family firms' governance decisions (e.g., Chrisman, Chua, Chang, and Kellermanns, 2007; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz, 2001 ).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, the theoretical background and the hypotheses are presented. Second, the methodology is described. Third, the results are presented and discussed. Finally, we conclude with research and practical implications.
TRANSACTION COST THEORY: AN OVERVIEW
Transaction costs are broadly defined as the "costs of running the economic system" (Arrow, 1969: 48) . The contract is the key element of transactions involving a transfer of goods or a service between separate parties (Williamson, 1985) . Williamson (1985) distinguishes between ex ante contracting costs associated with the drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding of an agreement and ex post contracting costs that are related to maladaptation, haggling to correct misalignments, set up, operating, and bonding costs. Attaining cost efficiencies is the principal concern in transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975b; Williamson, 1985) . Accordingly, the choice of markets, hierarchies, or hybrid governance structures is the key in minimizing transaction costs (Walker and Weber, 1984) . The transaction cost factors influencing governance decisions are asset specificity, opportunism and trust, and risk preferences (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Gulati, 1995; Williamson, 1985 Williamson, , 1991 .
Behavioral uncertainty derives from bounded rationality and agent's opportunism (Williamson, 1985) . As Simon (1961: 24) argues, individuals behave "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so" since the information received may not be perfect and individuals may have time and/or mental capacity limitations to fully process information. Accordingly, firms are unable to maximize utilities (Simon, 1955) and "contracts are normally incomplete" (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007: 649) . This leads to satisficing behaviors (Simon, 1959) in the governance of transactions to avoid the unpredictable opportunism of economic actors (Williamson, 1985) . Opportunism involves "self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1985: 47) on the part of agents, implying a certain amount of deception with regard to either the ability of an agent to fulfill the terms of the contract or the willingness to expend the required effort. In that regard, firms will be more likely to prefer hierarchical governance as the possibility of opportunism in transactions increases.
The other transaction cost element affecting governance decisions is asset specificity (Williamson, 1975b; Williamson, 1985) . High asset specificity in the form of site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, or dedicated assets leaves a firm vulnerable to opportunism (Williamson, 1981) . Hence, when asset specificity is high, the cost of governing transactions through market mechanisms may exceed the benefits of flexibility and reductions in capital investments and overhead through outsourcing. In such cases, hierarchy is expected to be the preferred governance structure and studies have supported this contention (David and Han, 2004; Lafontaine and Slade, 2007; Poppo and Zenger, 1998) .
Because of behavior uncertainty, opportunism can never been completely ruled out. As a consequence, management's risk preferences (Williamson, 1991) also influence governance decisions (Chiles and McMackin, 1996) . Yates & Stone (1992: 4) define risk as the "possibility of loss". In that regard, risk preferences tend to be based on personal and organizational factors (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Laughunn, Payne, and Crum, 1980) .
HYPOTHESES Family Firms versus Nonfamily Firms
Family firms are distinctive due to family involvement through ownership, governance, and management along with family's intentions for the transgenerational sustainability of the firm (Chrisman et al., 2005; Chua et al., 1999) . Family involvement and family intentions can affect the preferences and behavior of family business members with regard to capturing opportunities, resource acquisition and deployment, and performance. However, as Chrisman et al. (2005) highlight, we do not know enough about how family involvement influences firms' decisions and performance. Hence, we use the transaction cost theory factors (i.e., asset specificity, opportunism and trust, and risk aversion) to explain how and why the governance decisions of family and non-family firms might differ.
Human assets are a key element of asset specificity (Williamson, 1985) and are particularly relevant to the governance decisions of family firms. Human asset specificity is the extent to which job skills are specific to a particular firm and the ease of measuring the individual productivity (Williamson, 1981) . Training is a measure of human asset specificity (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) . The human capital of family members in a family firm is developed through long apprenticeships unlike those available in non-family firms (Le BretonMiller and Miller, 2006) . "Learning-by-doing" type of training between senior and junior family business members starts at home, continues through summer jobs, and extends into the life-long career of family business members. The family firm-specific training generates highly specific human assets based on tacit knowledge and experience (Penrose, 1959; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003) that are not easily transferable or measurable.
In addition, family bonds can align interests and lower information asymmetries to decrease governance costs (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, and Dino, 2005) . Parental altruism links parent's welfare to that of their children, which can foster trust, communication, and reciprocity (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Stark, 1995) . When altruism is reciprocal among family business members, opportunism can be mitigated (Chrisman et al., 2005) and this is expected to facilitate work environments exemplified by greater employee care, loyalty, trust, and motivation (Habbershon and Williams, 1999) . Nevertheless, when altruism is asymmetrical (Chrisman et al., 2004; Schulze et al., 2001) , family members may have opportunistic tendencies driven by non-economic goals (Habbershon and Williams, 1999) . However, family firm studies show that opportunism is generally lower in family firms than in non-family firms (Chrisman et al., 2004; Corbetta and Salvato, 2004) .
Family business members are also more likely to socially identify with the business and perceive the fate of the business as their own fate, strengthening their organizational attachment (cf., Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Sharma and Irving, 2005) . Hence, trust can serve as a governance mechanism and lower transaction costs substantially (Dyer and Handler, 1994; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003; Steier, 2001 ) by avoiding agent's opportunism issues through in-house production.
By contrast, non-family firms choosing in-house production may be less able to prevent moral hazard and hold-up problems among employees with highly specialized training. Therefore, non-family firms are more likely to utilize outsourcing than family firms.
In family firms, higher levels of ownership concentration have been associated with risk aversion (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2002) and family business owners' risk aversion tendencies are empirically supported (Gomez-Mejia, Hynes, Nunez-Nickel, and MoyanoFuentes, 2007; Romano, A.Tanewski, and Smyrnios, 2000; Schulze et al., 2001) . Accordingly, family firms are expected to be conservative in strategic decision making (Ward, 1997) . Since the threat of opportunism in market contracting is less easy to control, family firms may prefer hierarchies due to greater risk aversion (c.f., Brickley and Dark, 1987) . Thus, differences in human asset specificity, internal versus external opportunism, and risk aversion between family and non-family firms lead to the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1. Family firms are less likely to engage in subcontracting than nonfamily firms.
Antecedents of Family Firms' Subcontracting
In the next sections, we will outline three antecedents of family firm firms' subcontracting. Specifically, we argue that subcontractors with kinship ties and cost concerns will positively affect the level of subcontracting, while higher levels of importance of the performed activities will reduce subcontracting. Figure 1 portrays the aforementioned relationship.
-
Subcontractors with Kinship Ties. As discussed above, owing to high levels of trust, the threat of opportunism within the firm tends to be lower in family firms than in non-family firms and this should influence the relative attractiveness of hierarchical and market governance. However, the importance of intra-firm trust among family members is mitigated if family firms have the option of subcontracting with firms that are also owned by family members since these potential exchange partners should be considered trustworthier than non-family suppliers. Because trust is a social control mechanism replacing complex contracts and decreasing transaction costs of finding exchange partners, negotiating, and monitoring (Gulati, 1995) , the risk of opportunism will be lower if subcontractors with family ties are available.
Furthermore, family members who own upstream supplier organizations are also likely to possess a greater degree of familiarity with the family firm, thus counteracting the advantage of in-house production owing to human asset specificity. Finally, the personalism and particularism (Carney, 2005) of family firms provides them with the discretion to act selectively upon their preferences to utilize subcontractors who are family members. Therefore, the negative effects of human asset specificity, risk aversion, threats of opportunism on the outsourcing decisions of family firms will be lowered when subcontractors have kinship ties with the family business members.
Hypothesis 2. Family firms will be more likely to use subcontractors when subcontractors
with kinship ties to family business members are available.
Importance of Activities. High asset specificity can determine the importance of business activities. Williamson (1981) argues that in cases of high asset specificity, both the buyer and the seller prefer exchanges with continuity properties. Indeed, close monitoring and control by family owner/managers can enhance the quality of products or services and build long-term trust, goodwill (Sako, 1991) , and reputation (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988) with customers through repeated exchanges (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Tagiuri and Davis, 1992; Ward and Aronoff, 1991) . On the other hand, outsourcing can lead to economies of scale (Williamson, 1985) through decreasing costs (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) and avoiding expensive capital investments or risky borrowing (Eaton and Gersowitz, 1981) . Flexibility can also be enhanced (Harrigan, 1983) .
Nevertheless, difficulties of monitoring (Williamson, 1985) subcontractor behavior and performance (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) can increase the threat of opportunism that might negatively affect product or service quality and as a result put the family firm's reputation in danger. Maintaining reputation is a valuable intangible asset that can lead to long-term success and competitive advantages that outweigh contractually promised short-term cost efficiencies that are vulnerable to uncertainties (Leiblein and Miller, 2003) . Therefore, family firms may forego the possible benefits of outsourcing when family firm activities are highly important.
Hypothesis 3. The importance of family business activities is negatively associated with
family firms' subcontracting.
Cost Concern and Economizing. The extent of emphasis on economic and non-economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2005; Jaskiewicz and Astrachan, forthcoming; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003) differs in family firms. When non-economic goals dominate, family firms may be willing to forego efficiency opportunities that limit their ability to achieve non-economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2005) . For example, family firms that attach great importance to non-economic goals such as preserving the family's legacy are less likely to shed unproductive resources and business activities than non-family firms (Sharma and Manikutty, 2005) .
On the other hand, in line with the transaction cost principles of "economizing" and determining efficient boundaries through make-or-buy decisions (Williamson, 1981; Williamson, 1985) , when economic goals are more important, family firms may consider alternatives to increase efficiency, including outsourcing (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003) . Family firms focusing on economic goals are expected to make efforts to improve quality, reduce fixed and variable costs, and elevate flexibility. As outsourcing can help capturing these opportunities, the degree to which family firms focus on economic goals will increase the possibility that the subcontracting alternative will be preferred. 
METHODS

The Study
Cross-sectional data were obtained from a larger project designed to assess the economic impact of the counseling activities of the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) program in the U.S. in 2007. The SBDC conducts programs in each state, serving vast number of small and new firms each year. Hence, it represents the largest and best potential source available for the data of this study. The questionnaire was targeted to firm owners and entrepreneurs who sought the assistance of the SBDC. Two mailings of the questionnaires were sent to the entire population of 31,613 operating businesses that received five or more hours of counseling assistance from the SBDCs in operation in 2005 across the United States, excepting one state program. A total of 6,806 established businesses responded resulting in a 21.5% response rate. Unfortunately, missing values, which are common in family firm studies relying on primary data, reduced the final sample size used to test hypothesis 1 to 2087 (family and non family firms), and to 1790 family firms to test hypotheses 2 to 4.
In order to test for potential non-response biases, responses were divided into early and late respondents based on the time the respondents returned the questionnaire. There were no statistically significant differences between the first and second batches of mailings returned on the variable of interest to this study. Since relative to early respondents late respondents are likely to be more similar to non-respondents (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975; Oppenheim, 1966) , the tests suggest that non-response bias is not a significant concern in this study. Since the data were collected via a self-reported questionnaire, the potential for common method variance was present. The various tests for common method variance suggested by Podsakoff and Organ (1986) were performed. All items were entered into a factor analysis. The rotated solution presented seven factors where the first factor accounted for 14.84% and the seven factors accounted for 64.28% of the total variance. The tests showed no evidence of a common method bias problem. Unfortunately, due to government regulations pertaining to the use of SBDC data, an independent verification of the self-reported data was not possible.
Classifying Family Firms
As the study concentrates on family firms, we needed to distinguish between family firms and nonfamily firms. To do so, we follow Chua et al.'s (1999: 25) definition of family firms: "a business governed and/or managed with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families." Prior studies have operationalized this definition to classify family firms (e.g., Chang, Chrisman, Chua, and Kellermanns, 2008; Chrisman et al., 2007) . We followed their same procedure. The constructs were measured by the (1) percentage of the business owned collectively by family members, (2) number of family managers, and (3) expectation that the future successor as president of the business will be a family member, operationalized through a categorical yes-no response. The quick clustering technique in SPSS yielded a dichotomous classification of family and non-family businesses from 4167 established firms who provided complete data on those three variables (see Table 1 ). The cluster solution classified 3642 (87%) businesses as family firms and 525 (13%) as non-family firms, a proportion consistent with previous research (Chang et al., 2008; Chrisman et al., 2007; Chrisman et al., 2004 ).
Dependent variable
The dependent variable, the use of subcontracting, was measured by asking respondents to indicate "the extent to which their firms used subcontractors in 2005-2006" on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from "never" to "extensively."
Independent variables
All independent variables were measured by respondents' agreement with questions regarding subcontracting preferences. A 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5) was used. These variables are discussed below.
Subcontractors with kinship ties to the family business member(s).
To measure the importance of kinship ties with subcontractors, respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed that sub-contractors owned by family members were used.
Cost concerns. In order to measure the cost concern of family firms, we created a 4-item scale. Respondents were asked to rate the extent "they use subcontractors because they are less expensive than doing the work in-house"; "they use subcontractors to avoid making expensive investments in equipment, etc."; "they use subcontractors to avoid hiring employees"; and "they constantly change subcontractors in order to save money". The Cronbach alpha was 0.69.
Importance of activities.
Respondents were asked whether the extent that "part of their firms' activities will never be subcontracted because they are too important" influenced their subcontracting decisions. This item was reverse coded in order to test the proposed negative relationship between the importance of activities and subcontracting.
Control variables
We included control variables such as industry, age, size, and perceived past performance because of their possible influence on subcontracting decisions (Dewald et al., 2007) .
To control for the industry sector, five categorical variables were used to indicate retail, service, wholesale, manufacturing, and construction industries. Age was measured by the number of years the firms had been in business. The number of employees in 2006 was used to measure size.
We created a two-item scale to assess perceived performance. Respondents were asked to compare, on a 5 point Likert-type scale, their profitability (return on sales) to the respondents' expectations and sales growth to the competitors over a 3 years period. The Cronbach alpha was 0.75. Although performance was self-reported, research indicates that subjective and objective performance data are correlated (Dess and Beard, 1984) . Furthermore, these perceptive measures of performance have successfully been utilized in family firm research (e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston, Kellermanns, and Sarathy, 2008) Data Analysis Hypothesis 1 was tested by ANCOVA where the dependent variable was compared using a sample of 2087 established firms (family and non-family firms). Hypotheses 2-4 were tested via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression using a sample of 1790 family firms. The results are presented in the next section. Table 2 provides the descriptives and correlations of the variables used in the study. The results of the ANCOVA provide evidence to support Hypothesis 1. After controlling for industry, age, size, and past performance, non-family firms were found to be significantly more likely to use subcontractors than family firms (p<.001).
RESULTS
----------------------------------------------
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about Table 3 presents the results of the OLS regression models. Model 1 is the base model where we entered the set of control variables. Although the regression model was significant (p<0.05), only past performance and one industry control were significant (p<.05) with an adjusted R 2 of .01. In a second stop, we entered the independent variables in model 2. The change in R 2 was .10 and significant (p < .001). The adjusted R 2 of the model was .11. The regression provides support for both Hypothesis 3 (importance of family business activities) (β= -.05, p < .05) and Hypothesis 4 (cost concerns) (β= .32, p < .001) was obtained. In contrast, the result for Hypothesis 2 (subcontractors with kinship ties) (β= -.11, p < .001) was in the opposite direction as hypothesized. Overall, it is important to note however, that the highest relative influence, measured by the beta coefficient, was cost concerns (β= .32).
DISCUSSION
We apply transaction cost theory to explain the differences between family and nonfamily firms toward their subcontracting decisions. Our study discusses the notion that taking a transaction cost perspective to explore family firms' boundary decisions will further advance the theory of the family firm. As a result, our paper provides some initial answers to two important research questions: (1) Are family firms more or less likely to use subcontractors than nonfamily firms, and (2) What are the determinants of subcontracting in family firms? Overall, our ANCOVA results suggest that family firms tend to rely less on subcontractors than non-family firms. This finding suggests that family firms perceive greater efficiencies and economies by conducting certain activities in-house. More specifically, our OLS regression results regarding the determinants of subcontracting suggest that family firms will increase the use subcontractors when they are concerned about the costs involved in conducting certain operations. Furthermore, family firms will avoid using subcontractors when the activities are considered of primary importance to the business. Both of the results are consistent with the principles of transaction cost theory.
However, it is important to note that the results for the kinship determinant were in the opposite direction as hypothesized. A reason for this unanticipated result, which is nonetheless consistent with theory, is that small family firms may lack the option of subcontracting with firms owned by family members. If the option is lacking, the willingness of family firms to subcontract may be decreased. Unfortunately, our data cannot assess the extent to such interpretation.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper is one of the few attempts to use transaction cost theory to explain some of the differences in the governance or boundary decisions of family firms versus non-family firms. Particularly, the involvement of the family on making versus buying decisions tends to add non-economic factors that add layers of complexity for engaging in subcontracting. As such, this research not only adds to our understanding of family firm governance but it also provides further distinctions about its uniqueness from the mainstream. Second, this study showed the family firm specific antecedents of subcontracting in family firms. In that respect, family firms will opt to subcontracting to reduce costs; however, they will keep in-house activities that are important for them to remain competitive. As a result, both of these contributions move us a step closer toward a theory of the family firm (Chrisman et al., 2005; Conner, 1991) .
The limitations of our study also provide avenues for future research. First, the sample includes firms that are relatively small and may not be able to exploit the full benefits of subcontracting due to their scope of operations. Hence, future studies should explore the effects of transaction cost factors on family firms' subcontracting in larger family firms. Second, the data collection was cross-sectional in nature and we cannot confer causality from our observations. Thus, we encourage future studies to utilize a longitudinal design. Third, although common method bias was not a concerned for our study (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986) , the design of future studies would be significantly improved, if objective assessment of the subcontracting decisions taken by family firms were collected in addition to perceptual measures. Lastly, since our study was the first study of its kind on subcontracting in family firms, our study can be considered experimental in nature. Thus, future studies need to improve upon our utilized scales.
Future Research Avenues
Our study provides future avenues for research. Aside from the antecedents of family firms' subcontracting decisions that we have pointed out in this paper, there may be other determinants that may affect strategic decisions concerning different governance structures in family firms such as firm culture contexts and the extent to which the family firm has moved to a professional management structure (Dyer, 1988) . Moreover, future research should investigate whether the propensity to outsource varies according to the business life-cycle stage of family firms (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, and Lansberg, 1997) .
Furthermore, as noted above, the existence of non-economic goals might alter the effects of transaction cost factors on determining family firms' efficient boundaries. Wealth creation may not be the primary goal of all family firms as Chrisman, Chua, and Litz (2003) suggest. For example, if job creation for family members is a primary non-economic goal of a family business (Chrisman, Chua, and Zahra, 2003) , the effects of transaction cost factors on outsourcing decisions may be affected. In our study, we explored the effects of cost concerns assuming that wealth creation is a primary goal. Future studies need to clarify how non-economic goals impact the governance decisions of family firms.
Finally, although we alluded to the interplay of internal and external forms of opportunism in the paper, future research needs to assess on how the interaction of these two forms of opportunism affect family firm governance decisions. As such, a comprehensive study investigating how governance decisions are influenced by the interplay of transaction costs, agency costs, and reciprocal or asymmetric altruism in family firms would provide interesting insights.
Implications for Practice
The important aspects of our study are how the results of our empirical tests can be applied by entrepreneurs and family firms' members on subcontracting decisions. On one side, entrepreneurs can start benefiting for the inclusion of relatives in their business' activities. As prior research has indicated that family firms can be made when entrepreneurs start involving the family as the business age (Chua, Chrisman, & Chang, 2003) or that the family element reduces agency costs (Chrisman et al., 2004) , adding the non-economic factor of employing family members can provide economic benefits or even improve the level of competitiveness in the business before engaging in subcontracting decisions. Consequently, entrepreneurs may find future avenues of attaining competitive advantages by incorporating the family element in the business before exploring outside their organizational boundaries.
On the other side, established family firms can explore the benefits of relying on in-house activities before engaging in subcontracting activities. As our results suggest, the main tenets of transaction cost theory regarding economic efficiencies are reflected as costs concerns reduces the use of subcontractor within the firm. In that regard, the family element provides advantages toward attaining efficiencies that are beyond the non-economic benefit of keeping governance decisions inside. Following the results of Chang et al. (2008) about the predominance of family firms in less munificent environments, family firms may opt for preferring to engage less in subcontracting due to the lack of feasible and economical options outside the organizational boundaries. This implies that family managers can search for optimizing in-house activities that can generate better competitive prospects under such environmental conditions. In addition, as our sample indicates that these businesses are relatively small for engaging in subcontracting, involving family members can provide advantages to compete against larger and established entities. Particularly, governance decisions remain under the control of the family to reduce potential problems of opportunism from outsiders. As a result, the use of family members to reduce subcontracting activities represents an important resource that reduces not only transaction costs but also managerial conflicts.
In conclusion, our paper adopted a transaction cost perspective of family firm governance with respect to subcontracting decisions. Our research can only be seen as a first step in applying transaction cost theory to family firm's strategic decision making. Since transaction costs can significantly influence a family firm's competitive advantages and long-term survival, we hope that this study sparks future research. 
